Normative Experience: Deontic Noema and Deontic Noesis by Passerini Glazel, Lorenzo
Phenomenology and Mind, n. 13 - 2017, pp. 96-107
DOI: 10.13128/Phe_Mi-22432
Web: www.fupress.net/index.php/pam
© The Author(s) 2017
CC BY 4.0 Firenze University Press
ISSN 2280-7853 (print) - ISSN 2239-4028 (on line)
NORMATIVE EXPERIENCE: DEONTIC 
NOEMA AND DEONTIC NOESIS*
abstract
What is a norm? A. G. Conte replies to this question by enumerating five possible referents of the word 
norm (§ 1.). Focusing on the fifth referent, the “deontic noema”, I raise the question (§ 2.): How is the 
deontic noesis of a deontic noema to be understood? Through a reconstruction in terms of deontic 
noema of H. Kelsen’s “merely thought norm” (§ 3.), of O. Weinberger’s “Normgedanke” (§ 4.), and of 
L. Petrażycki’s psychological analysis of normative experience (§ 5.), I propose to distinguish (§ 6.) a 
genuine deontic noesis from theoretical (cognitive or hypothetical) noeseis of a deontic noema, and I will 
argue that, in the hypothesis that no normative phenomenon would be possible without a consciousness 
capable of the deontic noesis of deontic noemata, the concepts of deontic noema and of deontic noesis 
deserve further investigation.
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NORMATIVE EXPERIENCE: DEONTIC NOEMA AND DEONTIC NOESIS
Νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος.
There is no thinking without a phantasma.
(Aristotle, De memoria, 449b34-450a1).
According to Amedeo Giovanni Conte, the question “What is a norm?” – the fundamental 
question of a philosophy of norms – is a “false” question.
It is a false question because it rests on at least one false presupposition: the presupposition 
that the word norm denotes one, and only one kind of entity. This presupposition is false 
because there are (at least) five different kinds of entities which can be (alternately, but not 
alternatively) referred to by the word “norm” (Conte, 2007, p. 28; 2012, p. 59; 2017, p. 24).1
The five entities which the word norm can refer to are, according to Conte: (i) a deontic 
sentence; (ii) a deontic proposition; (iii) a deontic utterance; (iv) a deontic state-of-affairs; and (v) a 
deontic noema.2
Conte gives at least one example for every possible referent of the word norm.
1.1. The word norm refers to a deontic sentence (enunciato deontico, deontischer Satz) in the 
following example:
(1) The norm: “One ought to pay one’s debts” is composed of six syllables.3
1  This pentad of referents is a development of the tetrad of concepts of norm delineated in Conte 1970/1989. It is 
worth recalling that the German phenomenologist Adolf Reinach, with regards to legal enactments (Bestimmungen), 
distinguished five different phenomena: (i) the experience of enacting (Bestimmungserlebnis), (ii) the act of enacting 
(Bestimmungsakt), (iii) the proposition expressing the enactment (Bestimmungssatz), (iv) the content of the enactment 
(Bestimmungsinhalt), and (v) the effect of the enactment (Bestimmungswirkung) (Reinach, 1913/1953, p. 171; see also 
Reinach, 2012, p. 106; Loidolt, 2016). A partially similar analysis can be found in Spiegelberg (1935), where the level 
of the law-sentence (Gesetzessatz), the level of the law-thought (Gesetzesgedanke) and the level of the practical state-of-
affairs (praktischer Sachverhalt) are distinguished (see also Cacopardi, 2013-2014). As P. Di Lucia & L. Passerini Glazel 
(2017) recall, Spiegelberg also singles out sixteen different Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten for the word norm (Norm). Due to 
space limitations, in the present paper I cannot compare Reinach’s and Spiegelberg’s analyses with Conte’s, Kelsen’s, 
Weinberger’s, and Petrażycki’s ones.
2  An analysis of Conte’s enumeration can be found also in Borghi & Feis (2017). For a general survey on the 
philosophical investigations on norms and normative phenomena see Lorini & Passerini Glazel (2012).
3  I adapt Conte’s example in Italian to English. Conte gives a second example in Italian that cannot be plainly 
translated into English because of the different behaviour of the Italian modal verb dovere and the English verbs should, 
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What is composed of six syllables here is a (deontic) sentence.
1.2. The word norm refers to a deontic proposition (proposizione deontica, deontische Proposition) in 
the following example:
(2) The English deontic sentence: “One ought to pay one’s debts” and the Italian deontic 
sentence: “Si devono pagare i propri debiti” express the same norm.
What is expressed here by the two different (synonymous) sentences is a (deontic) 
proposition.4
1.3. The word norm refers to a deontic utterance (enunciazione deontica, deontische Äusserung) in 
the following example:
(3) To indiscriminately forbid all Arabs to enter the US immediately after 9/11 would 
have been an ill-timed norm.
Forbidding is here a norm-enacting act, consisting in a performative deontic utterance.
1.4. The word norm refers to a deontic state-of-affairs (status deontico, deontischer Sachverhalt) in 
the following example:
(4) Eike von Repgow’s book Sachsenspiegel (Saxon Mirror) is a codification of norms 
established among the Saxons.5
1.5. The fifth, and last, kind of entity which the word norm may refer to is a deontic noema 
(noema deontico, deontisches Noema). The word norm (or its synonym rule) refers to a deontic 
noema in the following two examples by Conte:
ought to, etc., as to the scope of negation. The second example given by Conte is: “La norma: ‘Gli studenti di Filosofia 
non devono iscriversi a Logica matematica’ è una norma ambigua” (Conte 2012, p. 59). 
4  Conte’s concept of deontic proposition can be compared to Alchourrón and Bulygin’s concept of norm-lektón. 
Alchourrón and Bulygin define a norm-lektón as the “prescriptive [deontic] counterpart of a [descriptive] proposition”, 
“the content of a merely possible act of prescribing” (Alchourrón & Bulygin, 1973-1989/2015, p. 91; see also 
Alchourrón & Bulygin, 1993; 1981/2015). Alchourrón and Bulygin do not distinguish, though, (as Conte instead does) 
the intensional (semiotic) phenomenon of a deontic proposition – i.e. a meaning, a propositional content – from the 
intentional (psychic or noetic) phenomenon of a deontic noema – i.e. a mental content (Conte, 2007; 2012; 2017; see also 
below, § 2., especially note 7).
5  This example is quite important, since it contradicts the claim that all norms are linguistic entities: the customary 
norms codified by von Repgow were neither linguistic entities nor language-related ones: they were neither deontic 
sentences, nor deontic propositions, nor deontic utterances; they were subsisting extralinguistic deontic states-of-
affairs, established by custom. Customary deontic states-of-affairs may, indeed, become established independently 
of, and prior to, their linguistic formulation, like in the famous example of the old saw “Drei sind frei [Three are free]”, 
which eventually gave expression to a long established unspoken customary norm (Th. Geiger, 1947/1964, pp. 57-64). 
True, some deontic states-of-affairs (those created by statutory norms, for instance), unlike customary ones, may be 
established by means of (or in virtue of) the linguistic performative deontic utterance of a deontic sentence expressing 
a deontic proposition; nonetheless, deontic states-of-affairs themselves, qua states-of-affairs, are, according to Conte, 
non-linguistic entities (be they established by means of a linguistic deontic utterance or not). It is also true that the 
paradigmatic examples of deontic states-of-affairs, at least in modern Western culture, are statutory norms; but it is 
false that every deontic state-of-affairs is a statutory norm.
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(5) Proposing a norm in a legislative assembly.
(6) In the absence of a provision, the court shall decide in accordance with customary 
law and, in the absence of customary law, in accordance with the rule [Regel, règle, 
regola] that it would make [aufstellen würde, établirait, adotterebbe] as a legislator (art. 1(2) 
of the Swiss Civil Code).6
2.1. In the present paper I focus on the concept of deontic noema, a concept that can be even 
more fruitful if connected to an analysis of the correlated deontic noeseis.
To better illustrate the concept of deontic noema, Conte sets it in contrast (i) with the concept 
of deontic proposition, and (ii) with the concept of deontic state-of-affairs.
(i) The concept of deontic noema cannot be reduced to the concept of deontic proposition, 
because a deontic noema is, according to Conte, an intentional – a noetic – entity 
(intentional with ‘t’), i.e. the correlate of an intentional act; on the contrary, a deontic 
proposition is an intensional – a semiotic – entity (intensional with ‘s’), i.e. the meaning of a 
sentence (Conte, 2006, p. 7947; 2012, p. 65).7
(ii) The concept of deontic noema cannot be reduced to the concept of deontic state-
of-affairs. According to Conte a deontic noema is merely a deontic state-of-affairs in 
intellectu, in the mind; symmetrically, a deontic state-of-affairs is a normative noema in 
actu, an actually existing deontic state-of-affairs – in the specific sense of the existence 
of a deontic state-of-affairs, whatever it may be.8
6  Conte expressly considers here the term rule (in Italian: regola) as a synonym of norm (in Italian: norma). The 
discovery of the example of the Swiss Civil Code is credited by Conte to Giuseppe Lorini.
7  It could be objected that the concept of proposition could be understood as nothing but a noema, and that 
consequently the introduction of the concept of a deontic noema is a duplication of the concept of a deontic proposition 
– and a violation of Ockham’s razor: Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate. But even if a proposition could 
be regarded as nothing but a noema, the converse does not hold: not every noema is a proposition – the domain of 
noemata is broader than the domain of propositions. 
One could still maintain that all normative noemata are nothing but normative propositions, that is, one could maintain 
the “non-transcendability of language” with specific regard to normative consciousness. It is my opinion, though, that 
normative experiences (normative Erlebnisse) are possible whose intentional object has not the form of a propositional 
noema. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a demonstration for this conviction, but hints in this direction 
are: Benjamin Lee Whorf’s and Rodolfo Sacco’s concept of “cryptotype” (Sacco, 1989; 2015); the normative experiences 
that can be associated to, or acquired through, direct imitation (see, for instance, Mormino 2016); the possible 
normative experiences of animals; Petrażycki’s concept of intuitive normative experiences (the intuitive normative 
experience driving one to help a drowning child for instance). An explicit refusal of “logicism” with regard to norms is 
also in P. Amselek (2017, p. 33).
8  In a private communication (July, 2017), Conte has clarified that the existence of a deontic state-of-affairs can be 
“empirically ascertained” through (i) the empirical investigation of the occurrence of a normative act or fact, and (ii) 
the correlation of such a normative act or fact with the meta-norms concerning the validity of norms in a specific 
legal system – and ultimately with the basic norm of that legal system (the Grundnorm in Kelsen’s sense). 
The truth of a statement asserting the existence of a deontic state-of-affairs in a legal system is, thus, both a contingent, 
a necessary, and a hypothetical truth: it is contingent, because the actual occurrence of the normative act or fact is 
contingent; it is necessary, because, once the occurrence of the normative act or fact has been ascertained, in virtue 
of the meta-norms concerning the validity of norms in that legal system the existence of the deontic state-of-affairs 
necessarily follows; it is hypothetical, because it ultimately depends on the hypothetical basic norm assumed by he who 
makes the assertion. On the verifiability of a statement asserting the existence of a norm cf. also Kelsen (1979/1991, 
ch. 46). Conte’s claim on the empirical ascertainableness of the existence of a deontic state-of-affairs can be compared 
to Jerzy Lande’s conception of the “correctness” (as opposed to truth) of the legal-dogmatic judgments on the positive 
bindingness of a norm [obowiązywanie normy] (Lande, 1948/1959, p. 828 ff., as cited in Fittipaldi, 2016b, p. 520).
2. Deontic noema 




2.2. Even if it is true that omnis determinatio est negatio, and thus a deontic noema is neither 
a deontic proposition, nor a deontic state-of-affairs, it is also true that non omnis negatio est 
determinatio: therefore, what is exactly a deontic noema?
Conte’s concept of deontic noema, which draws inspiration from Husserl’s phenomenological 
concept of noema, is defined by Conte simply as “the objective aspect of a deontic noesis”, as 
the correlate of a deontic noesis (Conte, 2006, p. 79-47).
However, Conte does not clarify how the “deontic noesis” – the subjective aspect of a deontic 
noema – is to be understood.
Is it to be understood as the mere mental representation of a possible, hypothetical, or 
fictional deontic state-of-affairs? Is it to be understood as an act of cognition? Or is it rather to 
be understood as a specifically normative experience, a genuine normatives Erlebnis? Or, again, 
different kinds of noeseis of a deontic noema are to be distinguished?
2.3. I think that when the question is confronted of how a deontic noesis is to be understood, 
the concept of deontic noema may prove very fruitful in at least two respects: on the one 
hand, for the investigation of a wide range of specific normative phenomena, such as the 
inference of norms by analogy or from past rulings, the inference of general principles from a 
set of norms, the analysis of the opinio iuris in customary law, the establishing of a norm from 
exemplary behavior, the analysis of normative cryptotypes, the analysis of the convictions as 
to natural or divine law, etc.; on the other hand, if Max Weber (1907/1976, pp. 22-23) is right 
in suggesting that “it is […] not the conventional rule of greeting, which personally bares my 
head when I meet an acquaintance, but my hand, [which] is prompted to do so […] through the 
‘conception of a norm’ [‘Normvorstellung’]”9, and if Weber’s Normvorstellung can be construed in 
terms of a deontic noema, then the deontic noesis of a deontic noema is an unavoidable moment 
not only of the phantasmic representation of a possible – non-actual – norm, but also of the 
actual operancy of valid or established norms – in the sense of deontic states-of-affairs – on 
one’s behaviour.
2.4. As an initial contribution to the analysis of the possible deontic noeseis of a deontic 
noema, I will construe Hans Kelsen’s concept of “merely thought norms” (§ 3.), Ota 
Weinberger’s analysis of norm as a thought-object (§ 4.), and Leon Petrażycki’s psychological 
analysis of normative experience (§ 5.) in terms of deontic noemata.10
3.1. Many theories of norms focus on norms as the product of a norm-positing act – as the 
correlate of an act of will, conceived of as the will to issue a norm – more than on norms as the 
objects of a deontic experience. Hans Kelsen’s theory of norms is emblematic in this respect.
According to Kelsen, “a norm is the meaning [Sinn11] of an act of will [Willensakt] […], of an act 
9  As Paolo Di Lucia (2003) recalls, an analogous remark has been made by Hans Kelsen: according to Kelsen, 
what becomes operant (wirksam) is not properly “the norm or the legal order in its specific existence as validity 
[Geltungsexistenz], […] but the fact that men represent to themselves the norm or the legal system, and this 
representation [Vorstellung] becomes operant insofar as it drives men to a conduct corresponding to their 
representation” (Kelsen, 1926, p. 8, quoted in Di Lucia, 2003, p. 187; my translation).
10  I make use of the term noesis in a broad sense, including not only intentional acts of cognition, but more generally 
all intentional acts of consciousness, whose correlate is a noema.
11  Kelsen’s notion of “meaning” is quite an ambiguous one: in some connections of Kelsen’s works, it can seemingly 
be compared to a proposition (i.e. a semantical or logical entity), in others to the pragmatic sense of a normative 
utterance (a pragmatical entity), in others again to Heinrich Rickert’s or Max Weber’s notion of Sinn (Kelsen, 1985, 
p. 12; Rickert, 1910). I discuss some of the issues connected to the understanding of Kelsen’s notion of norm as a 
“meaning”, a “Sinn” in Passerini Glazel, 2017a.
3. Merely 
thought norms 
in Hans Kelsen: 
phantasmic 
noeseis of a 
deontic noema
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of will directed towards the behaviour of others” (1979, p. 152).12 Kelsen expressly assumes 
the principle: “No norm without a norm-positing authority”, and establishes an equivalence 
between the validity of a norm and its specific existence.
Nonetheless, Kelsen admits that we “can think of a norm which has not actually been posited 
by any authority, i.e. which is not the meaning of any real act of will occurring in reality” 
(1979, p. 6).
At the same time, the correlation between the norm and the act of will – a correlation implied 
in the principle: “No norm without a norm-positing authority” – is, for Kelsen, a necessary 
one, which holds even when there is no actual norm-positing act of will, i.e. when a norm is a 
“merely thought norm [ein bloß gedachte Norm]” – a mere deontic noema, in Conte’s terms. A 
merely thought norm is indeed, for Kelsen, the correlate of a fictitious act of will:
I can think of a norm which has not actually been posited by any authority, i.e. which 
is not the meaning of any real act of will occurring in reality. But I can think of such 
a norm only as the meaning of an act of will which I think of at the same time. […] The 
principle “No norm without a norm-positing authority” remains valid, even if the 
authority’s act of will of which the merely thought norm is the meaning is fictitious 
[fingiert ist]. A merely thought norm is the meaning of a fictitious act of will (Kelsen, 
1979, p. 6; 1991, p. 6).
Kelsen, thus, understands the act of will, whose meaning is a norm, expressly as a norm-
positing will; and even a mere deontic noema (a merely thought norm) implies a fictitious 
norm-positing act of will of a fictitious authority.
3.2. However, the noesis of a mere deontic noema is not to be identified with the fictitious act 
of will implied in the deontic noema (the fictitious act of will is rather a part of the deontic 
noema). According to Kelsen, a merely thought norm is, instead, the correlate of an “act of 
thought” (Denkakt).
At the same time, this act of thought is not an act of knowledge: in Kelsen’s works, it takes the 
form, respectively, of an act of imagination, of a presupposition, of a hypothesis, or of a fiction – in 
the sense of Vaihinger’s philosophy of As-If (Kelsen, 1960/2000, p. 206; 1979/1991, p. 256).
Here, the object of thought – the merely thought norm – is not a pre-existent object given to 
thought: it is rather an object given by thought, a noema produced by thought itself.13
In Kelsen, thus, a deontic noema can be the correlate of four different kinds of noesis: 
imagination, presupposition, hypothesis, fiction.
3.3. As is well-known, in Kelsen’s pure theory of law the entire hierarchical structure 
(the Stufenbau) of a normative system rests on a basic norm (Grundnorm), which is not the 
product of a positive act of will of a norm-issuing authority; in this sense, the basic norm is, 
for Kelsen, a merely thought norm – a deontic noema – which he understood at first as the 
correlate of a hypothesis or a presupposition (1934; 1960/2000), and lately as the correlate of a 
fiction (1979):
12  Kelsen distinguishes “willing one’s own behavior” and “willing that someone else is to behave in a certain way”: 
only a willing directed to the behavior of someone else (where “someone else” can also be the alter ego) “has the 
meaning of an Ought (Sollen), i.e. of an order, a command, a prescription, a norm” (1979/1991, pp. 31-32).
13  The object of thought is not presented to, it is presentified by consciousness. For the distinction between presentation 
(Gegenwärtigung) and presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) see Fink (1929-1930/2014).
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The Basic Norm [Grundnorm] of a positive moral or legal system is not a positive norm, 
but a merely thought norm (i.e. a fictitious norm), the meaning of a fictitious, and not a 
real, act of will (Kelsen, 1979, p. 206; 1991, p. 256).
The whole normative system therefore rests upon a mere fictional deontic noema; but what 
kind of noesis exactly is the noesis of this noema, of this merely thought basic norm? 
Two interpretations are possible.
According to the first interpretation, the basic norm is a noetic norm: it is conceived of as 
a transcendental hypothesis of the science of law, and is thus the object of a theoretical 
hypothetical noesis.
On the contrary, according to the second interpretation, the basic norm is a nomic norm, a 
fictitious norm experienced as a binding norm by the subjects of the legal system, and is thus 
the object of a fictional deontic noesis.
4.1. A partially different analysis of a “deontic noema” can be found in Ota Weinberger’s 
analysis of “the norm as thought and as reality”, where he expressly confronts the question of 
the ways in which a norm can be a content of consciousness (Inhalt des Bewußtseins).14
According to Weinberger, a norm is not a material entity; it is an ideal entity [ideelle Entität]:15 it 
is “a thought [Gedanke]”, “in the same sense as this expression is used in characterising logic as 
the ‘analysis of thought’ [Gedankenanalyse]”: in particular, a norm is a thought “in an objective 
sense, divorced from the processes of consciousness” (Weinberger, 1970, p. 205; 1986, p. 33).
4.2. Weinberger, nonetheless, remarks that a correct grasp of the ideal nature of norms is 
connected to the way they actually operate: the ideal nature of norms is elucidated by the role 
they play in the reality of human life and action (1970, p. 207).
He consequently enquires in what ways a norm can be an effective content of consciousness 
(Inhalt des Bewußtseins), in what ways norms “leben” or “exist in the realm of human 
consciousness” (Weinberger, 1970, pp. 210-211; 1986, p. 40). According to Weinberger, a norm, 
or a Sollen (an ought), can be a content of consciousness in two different ways:
(i) as a “Soll-Wissen”, or “ought-knowledge”, that is, as the mere knowledge that a Sollen – 
an ought – “holds good for some human group, in which case it may be that the subject 
of the ‘ought-knowledge’ does not ‘will’ the ‘ought’ [das Gesollte]” (Weinberger, 1986, p. 
40; 1970, pp. 210-211);16
(ii) as a “Soll-Erlebnis”, or “ought-experience”, that is, as the experience of a Sollen – an 
ought – qua “experience of obligatoriness”, or “consciousness that something ought to 
be the case”; this Soll-Erlebnis consists in the will of the object of the ought [das Wollen 
des Gesollten]; this is the instance of “custom, law, or other normative systems”, that are 
14  Weinberger, like Conte, draws explicit inspiration from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology (see Weinberger, 
1970, p. 205; 1986, p. 33; Conte, 2006, p. 7947; 2012, p. 64n). Paul Amselek, too, drawing inspiration from Husserl’s 
phenomenological method, investigates legal rules as mental entities in Amselek, 1993 and 2017.
15  In the original German text Weinberger switches from “ideelle Entität” to “ideale Entität” and back again to “ideelle 
Entität” (in one and the same passage: 1970, pp. 208-209). Kelsen, on the contrary, considers the German adjective 
ideell, in its (ontological) meaning of “spiritual, belonging to the realm of ideas and thoughts, non-material”, more 
appropriate to norms than the adjective ideal, in its (axiological) meaning of “corresponding to an ideal” (Kelsen, 
1979/1985, p. 56).
16  It is unclear, from this definition of a Soll-Wissen, whether the knowledge that an ought holds good for some 
human group has to be understood as an empirical knowledge on the human group’s normative convictions, or as a 
dogmatic knowledge depending on the axiotic meta-rules of the human group’s normative system.
4. Normgedanke, 
Soll-Wissen and 
Soll-Erlebnis in Ota 
Weinberger
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“experienced as obligatory (as willed so) [als gesollt erlebt (gewollt)] by the supporters 
[Trägern] of these systems (not only by the norm-issuing organs)” (Weinberger, 1970, 
pp. 210-211; 1986, p. 40).
4.3. Weinberger, thus, points out that a deontic noema can be the correlate of two different 
kinds of noeseis:
(i) a theoretical (cognitive) noesis: the noesis of a Soll-Wissen;17
(ii) a truly deontic noesis: the noesis of a Soll-Erlebnis.
Weinberger understands the deontic noesis of a Soll-Erlebnis in terms of will (das Wollen 
des Gesollten), since in a Soll-Erlebnis the norms of a normative system are experienced as 
obligatory, or as willed [als gesollt erlebt (gewollt)], even though he does not make perfectly 
clear what he means by “das Wollen des Gesollten”; but it seems that the will of the ought (das 
Wollen des Gesollten) is not to be identified with the will of the norm-positing act, because he 
writes: “When I speak of the being or real existence of a norm, I am not concerned with the act 
through which the norm is posited” (1970, p. 210; 1986, p. 39).
5.1. Another author offering an analysis of what I propose to call a truly deontic noesis of a 
deontic noema is the Polish-Russian legal philosopher Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931).
One of the main points in Petrażycki’s theory of law is that real legal phenomena are to be 
found uniquely in the sphere of the “spiritual world”, i.e. of psychic phenomena (Petrażycki, 
1909-1910/2011, p. 6): according to Petrażycki, real legal phenomena are nothing but psychic 
processes (1909-1910/2011, p. 6 ff.), and precisely an “immediate combination of emotional 
and intellectual processes” (1909-1910/2011, p. 43).18
When one sees – as often legal scientists do, according to Petrażycki – legal phenomena “in a 
world external to the subject who is experiencing [them]” – when one sees, for instance, rights 
and duties as “properties” of the objects or subjects to which they are ascribed – he is subject 
to “an optical illusion”, to a misunderstanding determined by the projection outside of his 
consciousness of something that exists only within his consciousness (1909-1910/2011, pp. 8, 
40-45).
Such a “projective point of view” produces what Petrażycki calls “impulsive phantasmata”, i.e. 
the impression that legal phenomena like rights, duties and norms, exist outside of the subject, 
whereas they are nothing but the correlate of a normative psychic experience taking place 
within one’s own consciousness:
Moral and legal norms and obligations represent nothing actually and objectively 
outside the minds of the individuals asserting or denying their existence, and apart 
from those individuals. They are merely reflections or projections of the psychic states 
of those individuals (Petrażycki, 1909-1910/2011, p. 112).
The projected “norm” can be construed as a deontic noema that is the correlate of a phantasmic 
noesis and is improperly projected onto reality.
17  A Soll-Wissen can be an element of one’s unparticipant, nicht-teilnehmende Erfahrung without ever being, for him, 
the object of a participant deontic Erlebnis, of a teilnehmend Soll-Erlebnis. (The distinction between participant and 
unparticipant experience can be compared to Bronisław Malinowski’s notion of “participant observation”).
18  It has to be reminded that, along with the analysis of law and morals in terms of emotional experiences, Petrażycki 









5.2. The psychic experience that causes the phantasmic projection of a norm is, in Petrażycki’s 
analysis, an “immediate combination of an action representation and an impulsion rejecting or 
encouraging corresponding conduct” (1909-1910/2011, p. 30).
A norm (norm) in the proper sense is, for Petrażycki, the “content of a normative judgment”; 
and a normative judgment is the manifestation of “the existence and operation, in our mind, 
of immediate combinations of action representations and impulsions rejecting or encouraging 
corresponding conduct (that is repulsive and appulsive emotions)”:
The existence and operation, in our mind, of immediate combinations of action 
representations and impulsions rejecting or encouraging corresponding conduct (that 
is repulsive and appulsive emotions) may be manifested in the form of judgments 
[suždenija] rejecting or encouraging a certain conduct per se (and not as a means to 
a certain end), such as for instance: “A lie is shameful”, “One should not lie”, “One 
should speak the truth”, and so forth. Judgments made up of such combinations of 
action representations with repulsions or attractions I will term “practical judgments 
of principle” [principial’nye praktičeskie suždenija], or […] “normative judgments” 
[normativnye suždenij]; the content of such judgments I will term “principled rules of 
conduct” [principial’nye pravily povedenija], “principles of conduct” [principy povedenija], 
or “norms” [normy]. The corresponding dispositions [dispozicii] I will term “principled 
practical convictions” or “normative convictions” [normativnye ubeždenija] (Petrażycki, 
1909-1910/2011, p. 30; Petrażycki, 2012, p. 264, modified and integrated translation).
As Edoardo Fittipaldi points out, for Petrażycki the “core phenomenon” is “the combination 
of an action representation [the representation of an action in one’s mind] and an ethical 
emotion”, consisting in the impulsion rejecting or encouraging corresponding conduct 
(Fittipaldi, 2016c, p. 454).
The judgment manifesting such a psychic experience is not a linguistic phenomenon; it is an 
emotional act. A positive judgment is, for Petrażycki, an “appulsive-emotional act”; a negative 
judgment is a “repulsive-emotional act” (Petrażycki, 1908, p. 248, as quoted in Fittipaldi 2016c, 
p. 454).
A norm in its proper sense (as opposed to a projected norm) can thus be understood, in 
Petrażycki, as a deontic noema which is the correlate of a specifically deontic noesis, where 
the deontic noesis consists in an appulsive-emotional or repulsive-emotional experience 
associated to the mental representation of a given conduct.
5.3. If, on the one hand, Petrażycki’s analysis of normative experience as a specific deontic 
noesis, can be compared to Weinberger’s Soll-Erlebnis, on the other hand, it is important to 
emphasize that Petrażycki, unlike Weinberger, does not conceive the normative experience in 
terms of will19.
Petrażycki distinguishes, indeed, four elements of psychical life: (i) cognitive experiences, which 
are unilateral-passive experiences; (ii) feelings, such as pleasures and sufferings, which are 
unilateral-passive experiences; (iii) will, which is a unilateral-active experience; (iv) impulsions, 
which are bilateral passive-active experiences, such as hunger, thirst or sexual arousal, in which 
the passive side of a feeling is immediately connected to a (repuslive or appulsive) stimulus or 
appetence (ad-petitus) (1909-1910/2011, pp. 22-23).
19  Petrażycki criticizes the confusion of “will” and “demand” implied in some legal and political theories (1909-
1910/2011, p. 39).
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Normative experiences, according to Petrażycki, do not involve a (unilateral active) will: they 
involve an impulsion (a bilateral active-passive impulsion).
Therefore, in Petrażycki’s theory, a deontic noema (a norm in its proper sense) is the correlate 
of a normative experience, which is the experience of a bilateral passive-active impulsion 
connected to an action representation (and the direct correlate of the emotional act of the 
normative judgment which is a possible manifestation of the normative experience).
5.4. A question may arise, though: If there is no norm without a normative emotional 
experience, is it possible to have an unparticipant Erfahrung of a norm, a non-deontic 
noesis of a norm – for instance, the knowledge of a norm existing in someone else’s mind – 
independently of the participant Erlebnis of a norm?20
According to Petrażycki, one can acquire “information (indirect and more or less hypothetical, 
however)” about normative phenomena in the minds of others through an “inference by 
analogy”. 
But this possibility presupposes that one is acquainted with normative phenomena because 
of having personally experienced (erlebt) them; on the contrary, it is precluded in the case of 
“absolute legal idiotism”, i.e. “the impossibility to have legal experiences”: a man suffering 
from absolute legal idiotism “could not possibly know what law is” (Petrażycki 1909-
1910/2011, p. 15).
I have documented (in Kelsen, Weinberger, and Petrażycki) a plurality of phenomena that can 
be investigated through the concept of deontic noema, and that a deontic noema is not always 
the correlate of a deontic noesis: it can as well be the correlate of a theoretical (cognitive or 
hypothetical) noesis.21 
However, if Petrażycki’s claim about absolute legal idiotism is correct, no theoretical noesis 
of a deontic noema would ever be possible for a consciousness incapable of having normative 
Erlebnisse in general, i.e. incapable of deontic noeseis of deontic noemata.
The relevance of further investigation on the concept of deontic noema and on the correlate 
concept of deontic noesis becomes apparent if the hypothesis is advanced that without a 
human – or non-human – consciousnesses capable of deontic noeseis – normative Erlebnisse – 
of deontic noemata, the “normative landscape”, i.e. the landscape of normative phenomena, 
would be an empty landscape.22
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